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ABSTRACT
There are billions of people that use social media as a way to share information and communicate
with other users around the world and these social media sites provide easy platforms for sharing
images. Digital images can be used to hide messages which may contain incriminating evidence or
malware. This project focused on how images with hidden messages, called steganographic (stego)
images, can be shared on social media and how to detect the presence of such images. Two case
studies were performed with the goal of finding a way to both share images on Facebook and Twitter
that contain hidden messages and also to detect the presence of such images. This study found
that it is possible to share such images on Facebook and Twitter when following a very specific
method. Additionally, Quantization Matrices can be used to gather information about said images
which may include whether or not the image in question is a stego image.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is the art of hiding or concealing a message within another message. It is often
described as hiding a message in plain sight, meaning that an outsider looking in would not know
there is a message to find. There are many ways to hide messages. For example, messages can be
hidden within physical objects, other messages or images. A Steganographic (Stego) Image refers
to an image with a stego message hidden inside of it. With the dawn of the technological, it is fairly
simple to embed message data inside the bits of an image. In fact, there are many applications
available for free on different types of devices and platforms that embed a message into an image.
Sending digital images to one another has also become increasingly easier. These images can be
shared via Online Social Networks (OSNs) or Social Media Sites such as Facebook, Instagram and
Twitter. Sharing images on these sites make the images available to anywhere from a few hundred,
to a few billion users across the world. This is an issue because these images could contain a hidden
message, and the message could contain potential incriminating evidence, classified data or even
malware which can be easily looked over by investigators. With all of this in mind, this paper will
explore criminal and legal issues related to both social media and steganography, how existing tools
can be used to create stego images to share on different social media sites, and ways stego images
can be detected on OSNs.
Although previous work has been done on this topic, my contribution to this topic of study
includes finding a method in which stego images can consistently be shared on social media in a
way which retains the message. Additionally, I focus on finding a method to detect that an image




The following list defines important terminology that will be used throughout this thesis
• Steganography (Stego): Concealing a message inside of another message or object
• Image Steganography: Concealing a message inside of a digital image
• Cover Image: Used during image steganography to refer the original image that was used
to hide a message
• Stego Image: Used during image steganography to specify the image that contains a hidden
message
• Stego Message: This refers to the hidden message
• Online Social Networks (OSNs) or Social Media Sites Network where users can com-
municate and share information with other users as well as get updates from other users
• Quantization Matrices (QM): Matrix used during the process of compressing an image
into the .JPEG format
1.2 Document Overview
Table 1.1: Document Overview
Section Name Description
CHAPTER 1 Introduction Introduction to the paper, important terminol-
ogy as well as the Document Overview.
CHAPTER 2 Background Background information on steganography, im-
age steganography and Online Social Networks
Section 2.1 History of Steganography The origin of steganography and examples on
steganography techniques seen throughout his-
tory
Section 2.2 Steganography vs Cryp-
tography





Section 2.3 Image Steganography A brief overview of image steganography
Section 2.4 Online Social Networks What OSNs are, how popular they are and how
they can be used to share stego images
Section 2.4.1 Why use OSNs to share
stego images
Why OSNs are a good medium in which to share
stego images (if you do not want them to be
found)
CHAPTER 3 Legal Issues Overview of the legal and criminal issues related
to steganography
Section 3.1 Social Media in Criminal
Cases
Examples of criminal cases in which OSNs were
involved in either the crime or solving the crime
Section 3.2 Social Media Evidence Details on how and when information gathered
on social media can be used as admissible evi-
dence in court
Section 3.2.1 Privacy Issues with Social
Media Evidence
Explores when gathering information on social
media is a breach of privacy and when it is not
Section 3.2.2 Authentication Issues with
Social Media Evidence
Explores how to authenticate social media evi-
dence for court cases and why it is a challenge to
do so
Section 3.3 Steganography in Crimi-
nal Cases
Examples of crimes which involved steganogra-
phy
CHAPTER 4 Previous Work A compilation of previous work done of these top-
ics
Section 4.1 Steganographic Methods An overview of the previous work that has been
done on this topic
Section 4.2 Success of distributing
Stego Images on Social
media
A compilation of how previous researches used
OSNs as a method of distributing stego images
and how successful their methods were
Section 4.3 Summary A summary of the previous work that has been
done on this topic
CHAPTER 5 Case Study 1: How to
share stego messages on
Social Media
A case study on how to create and share stego
messages on Facebook and Twitter in a way that
retains the message
Section 5.1 Background Background on what the case study will cover
and why
Section 5.2 Method The method used to create and share stego mes-





Section 5.3 Findings Findings of the case study on how to create and
share stego images on social media
Section 5.3.1 Failures Findings related to where failures occurred when
creating and sharing stego messages on social me-
dia and how to avoid them
Section 5.3.2 Images Findings related to the images that were created
and if/how encoding a stego message inside the
image changed it
Section 5.4 Takeaways Takeaways from case study 1
CHAPTER 6 Case Study 2: How to de-
tect stego images on social
media using Quantization
Matrices
An analysis of quantization matrices on images
created in Chapter 5
Section 6.1 QM Overview An overview of what Quantization Matrices are
and how they are used
Section 6.2 QM Method The method used to analyze Quantization Ma-
trices
Section 6.3 QM Findings Findings related to analyzing the QM’s of the
images created in Chapter 5
Section 6.3.1 Table Quality Values
Findings
Findings related to analyzing the Table Quality
Values of the images created in Chapter 5
Section 6.4 Takeaways Takeaways from case study 2
Section 7 Conclusion Conclusion of the findings gathered during this
study and why it is important
Section 7.1 Recommended method for
creating and sharing stego
messages on social media
This section depicts the recommended method
for creating stego messages to share on social me-
dia in a way that will retain the stego message
Section 7.2 Recommended method for
detecting stego messages
on social media
This section details the recommended method for
determining if an image shared on social media
contains a hidden message
Section 7.3 Conclusions and Future
Research
This section contains the final takeaways from
this study, why it is important and recommen-
dations for future work to do on this topics.
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.1 History of Steganography
Steganography comes from the Greek words “steganos” (covered or secret) and -“graphy” (writ-
ing or drawing), or in other words, “secret writing” [3]. There are many documented cases of
Steganography being used throughout history. The earliest documented use of steganography was
in Ancient Greece. Herodotus documented the use of it in the book The Histories [4]. Herodotus
describes how Histiaeus, a Greek ruler at the time, shaved a slave’s head, tattooed a message on
the slave’s scalp, let the slave’s hair grow back and then sent that slave on his way to deliver a mes-
sage to Aristagorus who was the regent of the city of Miletus. Once the slave arrived, Aristagorus
shaved the slaves head to retrieve the message. The message encouraged Aristagorus to start a
revolt against the Persian king. If the slave had been intercepted, the interceptor would likely not
have thought to shave the slaves head to retain a message. Another instance of steganography that
Herodotus documented was when Demeratus alerted Sparta that the Persian King was planning
to invade Greece. In this instance, Demeratus used a wax tablet. He took the wax writing tablet,
scraped the wax off, carved a message in the wood and then applied a fresh layer of wax. Then, the
tablet just looked like a blank wax tablet, which would not arouse any suspicion. However, upon
its arrival to the Sparta, he removed the wax to reveal the secret message.
Steganography has also been seen in more recent history. During the revolutionary war, both
sides would relay messages by writing them in invisible ink. The invisible ink would be used to
write a message between the lines of a harmless message or on a blank piece of parchment. As
[5] explains, invisible ink used during the war usually consisted of a mixture of ferrous sulfate and
water. The message would be revealed either by heating the letter or applying a chemical such as
sodium bicarbonate. At the time, since both the British and Colonists were using invisible ink,
Washington wanted a more complicated ink that couldn’t be revealed with an “ordinary chemical”.
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He hired a British doctor, James Jay to create such a solution. This solution, when brushed with
a special chemical would appear.
In these instances, if anyone intercepted the message, they most likely would have not have
thought that they needed to shave someones head, melt wax or heat a piece of parchment to view
a message. This is the benefit of using steganography over cryptography.
2.2 Steganography versus cryptography
Oftentimes, steganography is confused with cryptography. Cryptography comes from the Greek
words “kryptos” (hidden) and “graphy” (meaning writing), or in other words “hidden writing”[6].
Whereas steganogrpahy’s origin, as stated in Section 2.1, is “covered writing”. Where steganogra-
phy is the art of hiding something in plane sight, cryptography is the art of creating and deciphering
codes.
If two people are trying to communicate and do not want other people to “listen” in or intercept
their message, they can use cryptography or steganography or both. When cryptography is used,
the sender will create a message that has been encrypted with some key that both sender and
receiver know. An outsider looking in will see that there is a message but will not be able to
decipher it without the necessary key. For example, if the sender wants to send the message
“MEET ME AT EIGHT TONIGHT”, they could encrypt the message by shifting the letters over
two spaces in the alphabet (A becomes C, B becomes D etc.). The message then would become
“OGGV OG CV GKIJV VQPKIJV”. The person decrypting the message would be given the shift
size (in this case two) in order to decode the message. This simple code, known as the “Caesar
shift cipher” is easy to break by brute force [7]. Because there are only 25 possibilities for what
the shift size is, someone intercepting the message, could try all 25 to see if the resulting message
makes sens.
With steganography on the other hand, the sender might send a plain message, a wax tablet
or a blank piece of parchment, for example, that has a secret message embedded in it. An outsider
looking in will see a plain message, wax tablet or blank piece of parchment and not know that there
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was another hidden message to look for. This technique of hiding messages in “plain sight” can be
extended to digital images as well, which brings us to todays digital era.
2.3 Image Steganography
Image steganography is the process of hiding a message in a digital image. The goal is to hide
the message in such a way that is imperceptible to human eyes. The study of image steganography
has led to many different algorithms in which to embed message data with that goal in mind. One
such method is called “least significant bit insertion” When using the least significant bit insertion
algorithm to encode a message inside of a digital image, the least significant bit of a pixel is flipped
(from a zero to a one or from a one to a zero) or remains the same, depending on the message.
In [8], the author explains that “Given a message data such as 11010010, the most significant bits
(MSB) are those that lie to the far left and the least significant bits (LSB) lie to the far right”.
Note that, a digital image can be represented as a stacked array of binary planes, where each binary
plane consists of zeros and ones. The author in [1] depicts this representation in figure 2.1. In the
case of bit planes, the “least significant bits” would be in bit plane 0. Because of how human vision
is limited and how the least significant bitplane of an image affects the color and intensity of that
pixel, if a least significant bit value is changed from a one to a zero or vise versa, it will most likely
not be noticeable to the naked eye.
The author in [8] provides more details on other algorithms that can be used to create stego
images, how these algorithms work and the pros and cons of each algorithm.
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Figure 2.1: Digital Image represented by a bit planes[1]
The images in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate how embedding a message in an image changes
the image. Figure 2.2a represents the “cover image” (the original image) and figure 2.2b represents
the “stego image” (the image that has a message embedded in it). This image was created using
the free app SilentEye on a Mac book laptop [9]. By looking at these two images and trying to spot
differences, one will most likely conclude that there are no real noticeable differences. However, in
order to determine exactly how these images differ, the images were subtracted from each other
using Matlab. The subtracted image (i.e. the difference between the cover and stego image) can be
seen in Figure 2.3. You can see that almost the whole image changed at least by a small amount.
There are also areas througout the image that stand out as having a large difference. This is where
the message is hidden.
Because there are so many different methods to embed a message into an image, detecting
the presence of a hidden message can be challenging. Each method needs its own detection..
Additionally, people are coming up with more methods for embedding data. This would not be an
issue if steganography was not used for criminal purposes but unfortunately it is (see Section 3.3




Figure 2.2: Cover Image versus Stego Image
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Figure 2.3: Difference between Cover Image and Stego Image in Figure 2.2
2.4 Online Social Networks
Social media is defined in Webster Dictionary as “forms of electronic communication (such as
websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to
share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos)” [10]. Online Social
Networks (OSNs) are places in which users (including individuals and companies) can post updates
on their lives, products etc. and share it with other “friends” or “followers”. A user that has an
account on such a network will use the network both as means of sharing updates on their lives as
well as “following” their friends, companies or celebrities to see updates from them. This definition
of Social Media also covers applications (such as Facebook Messenger or Google Hangouts) where
users send private messages to an individual or group of individuals.
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Social media was first introduced to the world wide web through a website called “Six Degrees”
in 1997 [11]. Social media became more popular in the early 2000s when MySpace was launched.
After MySpace came LinkedIn, then Facebook and around 2010 there were dozens of websites that
provided social media services. Around 2010 social media became extremely widely used partially
due to the fact that businesses started using it. Businesses would have a link to their Facebook
page on their website, mention their social media “handles” or addresses in commercials and so on.
Social media was also used as a means for clubs and groups to communicate in a group message or
invite people to events they were hosting. And as of November 23 2018, of the 7.593 billion people
in the world, 3.196 billion of them use social media [12].
Today there are thousands of different social media sites each with slightly different or even
very similar purposes [11]. For example, Instagram is used to share images, LinkedIn is for business
professionals to network, and Twitter is to share short snippets of information. A study done in
October 2018 ranked the popularity of these sites worldwide [12]. Table 2.1 details these rankings.
The asterisks denote messaging apps (see next paragraph for importance on these and why they
are distinguished from other sites).
Table 2.1: Most Popular Social Media Sites









9 Douyin/Tik Tok 500




14 Baidu Tieba 300
15 Skype* 300
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For purposes of this paper, the “messaging” apps (i.e. networks that are used for private or
group messages rather than posting information to the masses) will not be looked at. This is due to
the fact that if a person sent a stego image through a messaging app and that message is found, it
would be easy to determine the recipient of the message by looking at the person or people included
in that group chat. If that same image was posted on a social media site, it is harder to determine
the recipient since any one of that persons followers or friends could be the intended recipient. The
average number of Facebook “friends” a user has is 338 (as of March 5th, 2018) [13], meaning that
if a user posted a stego image on Facebook, someone would have to wade through an average of
338 people to determine who that secret message was intended for.
2.4.1 Why use OSNs to share stego images
Why use social media to share stego images, and does it really work? As stated in Section 2.4,
there are billions of Facebook users worldwide. Investigators do not have the time or resources to
scan every single image posted on social media for potentially hidden data. According to brand
watch, as of June of 2019, 3.2 billion images are shared on social media each day [14].
Even if investigators or companies did have the resources to analyze 3.2 billion photos each day,
once a stego image was found, investigators would have a harder time narrowing down the intended
recipient if it was posted on a social media account.
If a suspect involved in a crime sent an e-mail or used a messaging app to send a message to
someone prior to the crime, investigators would most likely take the time to analyze that message
or at least bring the other person in for questioning. If they found in image in this message and
were suspicious that the image contained a hidden message, they may try to find the message. If
instead, the suspect posted a picture of their dog on their Facebook page with a hidden message in
it (potentially containing information about the crime), any person looking at their account would
most likely think it was nothing more than a cute dog picture, except for the intended recipient.
Even if the investigators did find out that the dog picture had a hidden message, they would not
immediately know who the image was intended for. If the privacy settings are set so the profile is
13
public, anyone with a Facebook account would be able to see this picture. Even if this users profile
was private, that still leaves hundreds of friends or followers that have access to image. So not only
do investigators have to figure out that this specific picture includes a message, they have to figure
out who the message was intended for.
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CHAPTER 3. LEGAL ISSUES
Studying OSNs and how steganography can be used on them is important because steganog-
raphy and social networks can be used for harm. Social media has become increasingly important
and useful in solving crimes. Understanding how people might use steganography and social media
for harm or even just as a means of communication could lead to breakthroughs in cases.
The following subsections detail examples of when social media was used to solve or commit
crimes as well as crimes involving steganography.
3.1 Social Media in Criminal Cases
CBS News has a webpage devoted to “social media related crimes” in which it lists 23 different
cases where social media was either used to commit or to solve certain crimes [15]. In many of
these cases, the criminals were merely being illogical and bragged about their crimes on social
media. This lead their followers to alert authorities and all the evidence they needed to convict the
criminals was right there.
In other cases, the police posted photos of the criminal, asking users to come forward with
information, similar to an APB you may see on the news. Users on different social media sites will
often “share” these posts with their followers and the post will quickly propagate through many
users across social media. In many of the cases detailed in the above article, the investigator’s
post got around to enough people that someone who did have information saw the post and came
forward, allowing the police to catch the criminal.
Other times, crimes were a result of retaliation for things said or done on social networks. For
example, in 2011 a woman in Des Moines, Iowa was arrested after she burned her friends house down
because the woman “unfriended” her on Facebook. One of the most common crimes committed as
a result of social media is burglary. In these cases, a user posted that they were going on vacation
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and one of their followers, knowing the house would be empty, went over and robbed the house.
[15]
3.2 Social Media Evidence
Due to the fact that social media is a more recent means to help solve criminal cases, there are
different legal aspects related to when and how social media can be used as evidence in a court
case. The two biggest issues related to social media evidence are privacy and authentication.
In general, social media evidence is allowed in court if it is relevant, authentic and gathered
by legal means. Relevancy is rather self explanatory. Determining if social media information is
authentic is more involved and debated. Authenticity of social media evidence is explored in more
detail in section 3.2.2. The other issue then is whether or not information is gathered by legal
means. Oftentimes, users want to argue that when investigators or lawyers obtain information
from their social media account that it is a breach of their privacy. Therefore, the question of a
social media user’s right to privacy is explored in section 3.2.1.
3.2.1 Privacy Issues with Social Media Evidence
There are many legal issues related to internet privacy. The Stored Communications Act (SCA)
of 1986 was introduced to address that “the Internet presented a host of potential privacy breaches
that the Fourth Amendment does not address” [16]. This law addresses the privacy of internet
users and defines that it is the internet users personal right or privilege for privacy regarding stored
emails and other electronically stored data. The SCA was originally written in relation to Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) but does applies to social media sites today. This law details if and when
ISP’s and social media companies are allowed and/or forced to disclose personal data stored on their
networks. In a personal injury case, for example, a person cannot fight a subpoena for information.
One way to acquire social media evidence legally is through the use of a warrant. Additionally,
if information was gathered through “passive” means, then accessing that information does not
count as a breach of the user’s privacy. The author in [17] describes an example of a case in which
16
social media information was gathered passively. The case, Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hospital
Service Corp., took place in New Jersey in 2013. In this case, Ehling posted something offensive
on her Facebook page, one of her co-workers saw this post and brought it forward to her manager.
The hospital then fired her. She tried to sue the hospital, stating that they violated the SCA by
accessing her post. However, the hospital did not actively seek out this information, but rather, the
information was provided to management without coercion or payment. Therefore, they did have
the right to access this information. Although this court case is not an example where social media
information was not used as evidence, it does set an important precedence for when information
on social media is really considered “private”.
Another way in which investigators are allowed to gather information from social media without
breaching the user’s privacy is in a personal injury case. One case, detailed by [18], was Largent
v. Reed. During this case, the court actually ordered Largent to hand over her Facebook login
information to the defense counsel so that they could inspect it for evidence. They had two weeks to
gather information from it before she was allowed to change her password. This is one of the most
intrusive methods of gathering information and is not often popular with the parties in question or
even courts. In fact, not all courts have endorse this method.
The author in [18] explains that because the purpose of social media is to share information
with people, that users cannot expect that this information will remain private. She states, “Courts
generally find that ‘private’ is not necessarily the same as not public. By sharing the content with
others even if only a limited number of specially selected friends the litigant has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the shared content.”
3.2.2 Authentication Issues with Social Media Evidence
The main issue with authenticating social media evidence is related to the fact that it is possible
for accounts to be hacked, meaning that it is not guaranteed that the post was, in fact, posted by
the user in question. Additionally, a user could share their social media log in information with a
friend and that friend might post on their behalf.
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One author, Jared Staver, details information regarding authentication issues related to social
media evidence discussed next [16]. In his paper, he references a Pennsylvania supreme court case,
Commonwealth v. Mangel. In this particular case, the social media evidence on a Facebook post
was not allowed in court, due to the fact that “the information identifying the defendant was not
enough to allow the Facebook posts as evidence”. Staver states, “anyone wishing to use social media
evidence in a case must present direct or circumstantial evidence that corroborates the identity of
the author”. This can be done, for example, through testimony or an expert witness.
Staver explains that “no aspect of social media content makes it inherently inadmissible in
court”. Social media evidence needs to meet the requirements related to the Rules of Evidence.
However, the main difficulty with social media evidence (as detailed in the case above) is authenti-
cation. Or more specifically, authenticating that the information posted was in fact posted by the
user in question. There is currently no consensus across all courts on the best way to do this. Some
treat social media evidence authentication the same as a traditional “hard copy” piece of evidence.
Others may require more authentication such as the Maryland Supreme Court case Griffin v. State
of Maryland in 2011. This court determined that “the party [must] prove no one else was the
author of the content”.
There are still many legal issues related to when and how social media can be admissible in
court and although there have been court cases related to this in different states supreme courts,
there is still no “gold standard” or consensus across all courts in the US. And although social media
can be extremely helpful in solving cases, some still argue this is an invasion of privacy. Others
are concerned that there is not always a guarantee that a specific user was the one who posted the
content on their page.
3.3 Steganography in Criminal Cases
Steganography can be used as a means of communication between criminals or criminal orga-
nizations, a way to share classified information or even as a means to hack into peoples computers.
This section details specific cases in which steganography was used.
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The “first confirmed use of this high-tech form of data concealment in real life” was reported in
2010 by NBC [19]. They reported a case in which Russians were arrested and accused of encoding
messages in online pictures. Although the details of this information and how it was hidden are
classified, it goes to show that transmitting hidden messages via images can be used to transport
secret or malicious data. This article also points out why this method is so difficult to detect and
that is that the “sheer numbers of pictures online allow stego images to hide with the safety of
numbers”. This article also sites that after 9/11 there were rumors that Al Qaeda hid messages
inside pornographic images although it was never confirmed.
In 2012, the Al Qaeda were caught transporting information through the use of steganography.
NBC reported that Germany security officials caught a Pakistani Al Qaeda operative with a memory
disk containing a pornographic video that embedded over 100 documents outlining plans for terror
attacks through Europe [20]. In this case, a video was used because it can hide more data than
an image. The authors cite how difficult steganography is to detect since the data is hidden in
plain sight also explaining that a pornographic video might be the last place they would look.
Professor of Information at UC Berkeley, Steven Weber, explains that a government analyst might
be uncomfortable looking at pornographic videos on their laptop screen.
Another case in which steganography was used to hide malware that allowed attackers to hack
into people’s computers was detailed in a BBC article from 2015 [21]. In this case, they reported
on an instance where hackers posted links to photos on twitter that contained instructions for how
to obtain information for the users network. The image and Twitter account was believed to be
created from a tool called Hammertoss developed by a Russian group. This tool creates the twitter
account, posts a link to a photo on their Twitter account and embeds instructions into that image.
In most cases, the instructions are embedded over multiple photos making this difficult to detect
and anti-virus software often miss the attack.
In [22], the authors talk about how common it is to use steganography as means of hiding
malware. The authors additionally conducted an experiment involving “click bait”. Click bait
is essentially some sort of image or link that contains a catchy phrase or interesting information
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targeted to get users to click on it. In this study, the authors wanted to see how often people would
open a link that stated “Is your PC virus-free? Get it infected here!” They were shocked to see that
during six months, 409 people opened the link “either by mistake, out of curiosity or stupidity”.
This goes to show that people often open up things, sometimes on accident and sometimes by
naivety, that can cause harm to their computer.
With steganography it is even easier to get people to “fall for” downloading or opening something
that has malware because it is hiding in some sort of image that just by looking at it does not
seem harmful. [23] explains that not only is it often easy to get users to open up images with
malware hidden using steganography, but most security tools do not even look for data hidden
using steganography. This is mostly due to the fact that steganographic data can be difficult to
detect and “The performance challenges of scanning almost every file for small, non-impacting
anomalies are huge. Its just not practical to check every file coming in and out of an organization
at the depth required.”
In all of the cases detailed above, the key to cracking them was knowing that the image or video
in question needed to be analyzed further to see if there was something hidden in it. If taken at
face value, the pornographic video, did not look any more suspicious than a pornographic video
can be, but further investigation revealed it was also a means to communicate terror attacks across
a large organization. The importance of the following research, then, is to complete case studies
of how steganography can be used in social media and how to detect the presence of such online
steganographic images.
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CHAPTER 4. PREVIOUS WORK
4.1 Previous Work Overview
The following publications analyzed using social media as a means for sharing secret messages
through image steganography:
• Transmitting Hidden Information using Steganography via Facebook by Nathaniel D. Ams-
den, Lei Chen and Xiaohni Yuan [24]
• Analysis of Facebook Steganographic Capabilities by Nathaniel D. Amsden and Lei Chen [25]
• Pictographic steganography based on social networking websites by Feno Heriniaina R. and
Xiaofeng Liao [26]
• Using Facebook for Image Steganography by Jason Hiney, Tejas Dakve, Krzysztof Szczypi-
orski and Kris Gaj [27]
• The OSN-Tagging Scheme: Recoverable Steganography for Online Social Networks by Tayanna
Morkel [28]
• Secret Message Sharing Using Online Social Media by Jianxia Ning, Indrajeet Singh, Harsha
V. Madhyastham, Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy, Guohong Caox, and Prasant Mohapatraz [29]
• Steganographic Checks In Digital Forensic Investigation: A Social Networking Case by Brian
Cusack and Aimie Chee. [30]
All of these articles focused on the technology of creating and sharing images via social media.
They did not, however, consider detecting the presence of a secret message in online images. Most
of the articles focused on Facebook, most likely since it is the most popular OSN. This chapter
details the findings of these articles and creates a comprehensive look at the work that has already
been done on this topic.
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4.2 Success of distributing Stego Images on Social media
There are many different methods to embed a message into an image. Some of these methods
include least significant bit insertion (described in Section 2.3 above), masking, filtering, transfor-
mations and watermarking. In [24], the authors detail how different methods work and their pros
and cons. If a user did not want to or was not technically capable of implementing an algorithm
themselves, there are a wide variety of applications out there available for free that, given an image
and a message, will perform the necessary embedding to create a stego message. A quick google
search leads to the following two links, both of which list ten or more free apps for performing
steganography. These links list apps that can be downloaded onto an iPhone or Android phone in
addition to apps that can be downloaded onto a Windows or Mac PC. So creating a stego image
can be as simple as downloading a free app. Many more apps for mobile phones can be found on




Even though there are tools available for download that create stego messages, not all these
tools and methods work effectively with social media. This is due to the fact that many social
networking apps compress data in such a way that the message is lost.
In the seven papers listed in Section 5.1 above, they completed case studies that used different
apps or algorithms to create stego images, uploaded these images to different social media sites,
then downloaded the images to see if they could detect the hidden message. Most of the case
studies focused on Facebook but some also included Twitter, Google+ and Flickr. Facebook rarely
retained the hidden message, Google+ always retained the hidden message and Twitter and Flickr
were somewhere in the middle. Table 4.2 below shows which sites retained the stego message after
uploading and downloading the image created from the given app or algorithm. TheDdenotes the
message was retained all of the time, the D* means the message was retained in some instances,
22
the X denotes the message was not retained and the N/A means the given algorithm or app was
not tested with the listed Social Network. The subscripts list which source that particular study
was completed under. Table 4.1 is a key of the coloring in Table 4.2. The key reason that the
message was not recoverable is due to the way in which social media sites compress images before
posting them.
Table 4.1: Key for ”Social Networks versus Stego Apps” Table
Key
The stego message created by the listed tool was always retained after uploading it to and then
downloading it from the listed Social Network
The stego message created by the listed tool was sometimes retained after uploading it to and then
downloading it from the listed Social Network
The stego message created by the listed tool was never retained after uploading it to and then
downloading it from the listed Social Network
There is no existing work done on whether or not the listed app works with the listed Social Network
Table 4.2: Social Networks versus Stego Apps
Facebook Google+ Twitter Flickr
EOF X[30] D[30] N/A N/A
F5 X[27],[29] D[29] D[29] X[29]
Ghost Host X[29] D[30] X[29] X[29]
Incognito X[27] N/A N/A N/A
Invisible Secrets X[30] D[30] N/A N/A
JP Hide & Seek D*[24],[25],[27],[30] D[30] N/A N/A
Open Puff X[27] N/A N/A N/A
Our Secret X[27] N/A N/A N/A
Outguess Rebirth X[27],[29] D[29] D[29] X[29]
S-Tools X[30] D[30] N/A N/A
Silent Eye X[30] D[30] N/A N/A
Steganography X[27] N/A N/A N/A
Steghide D*[27],[29],[30] D[29],[30] D[29] X[29]
YASS D*[29] D[29] D[29] D*[29]
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As you can see in Table 4.2, there were no methods used that consistently retained stego images
after posting them on Facebook. Therefore, many studies went further and investigated different
methods that would consistently retain stego messages after sharing them on social media.
One method proposed to mitigate this issue can be found in Morkel’s paper [28]. In this
paper, the author proposes using an “OSN Tagging scheme” to embed message data. This method
follows the basic algorithm “Caronnis tagging scheme”. This tagging scheme first identifies specific
locations based on variance and brightness level that are suitable for inserting tags. These locations
are NxN bit rectangles. Then the brightness level of these tags is adjusted to create a message. For
example, if the brightness is increased, this could represent a 1 and if the brightness is decreased,
this could represent a 0. Morkel implemented this algorithm and tested it by uploading images
to Facebook and then re-downloading them. They tested different size tags and found with a tag
size of 8x8 pixels there was a 100% recovery rate of the message. In this experiment, they also
tested different brightness adjustment levels and recommend an adjustment of 2% to mitigate how
Facebook compresses images. The drawback with this method, however, is that in order to extract
the message, it must be compared to the original image. This means that the person who is trying
to communicate through this secret message has to get the original image to their correspondent(s)
first, meaning that a line of communication must be established prior to sharing the image to
everyone on social media.
Another alternative method was described in [26]. The authors propose using pictographs as a
way of communicating rather than embedding messages. Pictographs are a series of images that,
when compared with a dictionary of some sort spell out a message. The example they give in their
paper is that a picture of a car could mean “car”, a picture of a heart could mean “love” etc.
In this method, it does not matter if any bits are changed during a Social Networks compression
because even if its compressed or resized, a car will still look like a car after its posted. Therefore,
this algorithm will work 100% of the time. However, like the algorithm listed above, there needs
to be an exchange of the dictionary prior to the message extraction. The message is completely
meaningless without knowing how to interpret it.
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4.3 Summary
Many different studies have been done to see which social networks retain hidden messages
using different stego apps. The consensus between these articles is that Facebook and Flickr rarely
retain stego messages, Twitter sometimes retains messages and Google+ always does. Additional
studies in [28] and [26] develop different methods of sending stego data over Facebook that does
retain the message. Although the authors in both papers were able to devise methods that work,
there are drawbacks to their methods. Also, although Google+ always retains messages, the site
was discontinued in April of 2019, so no further studies will be done on that site. Facebook, being
the most popular social media site, would be the ideal network to study. Some methods that other
articles found useful in retaining Facebook stego images include posting images as “cover photos”
since they are embedded differently, making your image a certain size before it is posted, or using
a tagging scheme versus other embedding methods.
The next step aims at finding a combination of stego app and social network that consistently
retains the stego message. Chapter 5 below includes details on this case study. After a method of
creating and sharing stego messages is found, additional analysis will be done to determine if there
is a way to detect that a certain image contains a secret message. This will be done by analyzing
quantization matrices (QMs). Details on what QMs are and findings related to analyzing them can
be found in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY 1: HOW TO SHARE STEGO MESSAGES ON
SOCIAL MEDIA
5.1 Background
Much of the previous research done on sharing steganographic images on social media found
that posting images on social media often strips the message data from the image due to the
different compression methods that social media sites use (See Chapter 4 above). The research
below focuses on finding consistent methods to share stego messages on social media sites so that
the stego message is retained. Table 5.1 shows the top 11 most popular social networking apps why
we chose to include or exclude them in our research. No messaging or foreign apps were used. See
Section 2.4 above for details on why messaging apps were skipped over.
Table 5.1: Most Popular Social Media Sites and Why to Research or Not To
Rank Network Will Re-
search
Reasoning behind decision
1 Facebook Yes Most popular app
2 YouTube No Shares Vidoes, not images
6 Instagram No Does not allow the ability to download images,
so there is no way to retrieve stego messages
8 QZone No Foreign App
9 Douyin/Tik Tok No Foreign App
10 Sina Weibo No Foreign App
11 Twitter Yes Second most popular app that hasn’t been dis-
qualified
Previous work found that they were able to retain message data after uploading to Facebook in
some circumstances. One study found that Facebook sometimes retained data when the JP Hide
& Seek Stego app was used. Another study had success in retaining stego messages when Facebook
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photos were uploaded as “Cover Photos” instead of timeline photos. Previous studies had much
more success when it came to retaining messages after sharing stego images on Twitter.
We chose the following stego applications to create stego images:
Table 5.2: Steganography Applications to Use in Research
App Name Where to Find Compatibility
JP Hide & Seek http://linux01.gwdg.de/ alatham/stego.html Windows
Silent Eye https://silenteye.v1kings.io/ Windows, Linux and Mac
JP Hide & Seek was chosen because previous studies found that JP Hide & Seek had some
success with creating stego images that Facebook retained. Silent Eye was chosen because it can
be used on either a Mac or a PC. Both applications can be downloaded for free from the sites listed
in Table 5.2.
5.2 Method
Using the information gathered from previous studies we constructed the procedure detailed in
Figure 5.1 to create and share stego images. From these images created, we were able to determine
the viability of passing a hidden message this way. Note that there were two different methods used.
Method 1 uploaded the image directly from the phone to the social media site, whereas method 2
uploaded the photo from the phone to the PC, then from the PC to the social media site. Table 5.3


































In regards to Figure 5.1, all images that were uploaded to Facebook were uploaded as Facebook
“Cover Photos” (which is a type of Facebook image that is treated differently than “timeline
photos”). JP Hide & Seek was used on a Windows PC. The message hidden using JP Hide & Seek
was done so by hiding a text files inside the image. The same text file was used for all of the trials.
SilentEye was used on a Mac laptop. SilentEye allows the user to either hide a file inside the image
or type a message directly into the application. For trials completed with SilentEye, the message
was hidden by typing a message directly into the tool. The same message was used for all trials.
SilentEye also allows the user to specify a Luminance interval, JPEG quality, Header position,
PassPhrase and whether or not to enable encryption and compress the data. For the purposes of
this experiment, the default values were used. Figure 5.2 is a screenshot of the default values used
when encoding a message inside an image using the SilentEye application.
Figure 5.2: SilentEye application default values for encoding
During this method, there are four different images created that are saved to the PC. The
images created correspond to Image 1, 3, 4 and 6 in the method depicted in figure 5.1. These
images may also be referred to using the following naming convention:
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• Image 1: Original Image before [Facebook or Twitter]
• Image 3: Original Image after [Facebook or Twitter]
• Image 4: Stego Image before [Facebook or Twitter]
• Image 6: Stego Image after [Facebook or Twitter]
5.3 Findings
Table 5.3 shows how the social media app/stego app combination fared. The “Method” column
refers to if method 1 or method 2 (described above in figure 5.1) was used. Rows that have a
method of “both” contain the total of how both methods fared. The “# of Trials” column is the
number of trials performed with that particular pairing. The “% success” column is the percentage
of trials in which the stego message was successfully retrieved from Image 6. The “Where Failure(s)
Occurred” column describes where in the process the image application failed to extract the stego
message from the image (if a failure occurred).
5.3.1 Failures
This subsection details findings related to where during the process failures occurred and how
these can be avoided. See the last column in table 5.3 for which trials these failures occurred in.
When using Silent Eye, any failures that occurred did not occur after the photo was shared
on social media, but rather immediately after the stego tool was used. All stego images that were
created successfully did retain the stego message after being uploaded to Twitter or Facebook. So
the failure was with Silent Eye creating an image and not in social media stripping the image away.
In order to avoid these failures, one would merely need to verify that the image SilentEye created
does have the stego message in it prior to sharing it on social media. To do so, they would run their
new image through the SilentEye decoding process and verify a message is found. If no message
was found, then they know that no message will be found if they share that image on social media.
If this happens, they can try using a different image.
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Facebook Silent Eye 1 20 80.0% All failures occurred during step
5 in the diagram above.
” ” 2 37 91.9% All failures occurred during step
5 in the diagram above.
” ” Both 57 87.71% All failures occurred during step
5 in the diagram above. 50 of
the 57 trials were successful.
Facebook JP Hide &
Seek
1 15 100.0% N/A
” ” 2 40 32.5% All failures occurred during step
8 in the diagram above.
” ” Both 55 50.90% All failures occurred during step
8 in the diagram above. 28 of
the 55 trials were successful
Twitter Silent Eye 1 15 86.7% All of the failures occurred dur-
ing step 5 in the diagram above
” ” 2 40 67.5% 4 of the failures occurred during
step 5 in the diagram above and
**9 of the failures occurred dur-
ing step 8 in the diagram above.
” ” Both 55 72.72% 6 of the failures occurred during
step 5 in the diagram above and
**9 of the failures occurred dur-
ing step 8 in the diagram above.
40 of the 55 trials were success-
ful
Twitter JP Hide &
Seek
1 15 20.0% All failures occurred during step
8 in the diagram above.
” ” 2 40 5.0% All failures occurred during step
8 in the diagram above.
” ” Both 55 9.09% All failures occurred during step
8 in the diagram above. 5 of the
55 trials were successful
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Using JP Hide & Seek to create stego images to share on Twitter was only successful in 5 of the
55 trials. This method would not be recommended to use for sharing stego images over Twitter.
Silent Eye would be recommended instead. The SilentEye tool can be used on a Mac or a Windows
PC.
Another interesting finding is that JP Hide & Seek was much more successful when the photo
was uploaded from the phone to the PC then the PC to the social media site instead of uploading
the photo directly from the phone to the social media site.
5.3.2 Images
This subsection details findings related to the stego images that were created.
5.3.2.1 JP Hide & Seek Images
When using JP Hide & Seek on images downloaded from social media sites (i.e. images that have
gone through some sort of compression algorithm), the tool generated a warning message, saying
“The file you hid in this jpeg has caused statistically significant change an may be detectable”
(see figure 5.3). If JP Hide & Seek was used on an image prior to it being uploaded to social
media (i.e a non-compressed image), the JP Hide & Seek warning message did not pop up. The
four images below depict cover and stego images generated using JP Hide & Seek before the social
media compression versus the cover and stego images generated using JP Hide & Seek after the
social media compression. Even though the tool says the change may be detectable, from a personal
observations, it does not appear as if there is an observable difference. The four images below show
the progression of the image.
Note, The figures in Figure 5.4 relate to the figures described in Figure 5.1 above in the following
ways:
(a) Figure a corresponds to “Image 1” in the method
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Figure 5.3: JP Hide & Seek warning message
(b) Figure b is “Image 1” in the method ran through the stego app. This image is not used or
shown on the diagram above because the only way to successfully maintain stego data was to
upload it to the social media site before running the image through a stego app
(c) Figure c corresponds to “Image 3” in the method
(d) Figured corresponds to “Image 4” in the method
To fully understand how different these images are, a subtraction was done between the two
images using Matlab. The image differences can be seen in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5a shows the difference between Figures 5.4a and 5.4b. This represents the difference
between the original image and the stego image created from that. Here there are small, seemingly
random dots of differences throughout the image. Figure 5.5b shows the difference between Figures
5.4c and 5.4d. This represents the difference between the image downloaded from Facebook and
the stego image created from that. Here that the dots of differences are much larger, because the
pixels themselves are larger. This is due to the fact that the image downloaded from Facebook
is a lot smaller than the original so there are less pixels in the image and therefore they look
larger. Although the differences themselves are bigger, they are still scattered seemingly randomly
throughout the image.
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(a) Cover Image (b) Stego image created from Figure 5.4a
(c) Cover Image after uploading/downloading Image
5.4a to and from from Facebook
(d) Stego image created from Figure 5.4c
Figure 5.4: JP Hide & Seek Comparisons
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(a) Difference between Figures 5.4a and 5.4b (b) Difference between Figures 5.4c and 5.4d
Figure 5.5: JP Hide & Seek Differences
When it comes to using the JP Hide / Seek tool, when Figure 5.4b was created from Figure
5.4a, there was no warning saying that the difference may be noticeable. However, when Figure
5.4d was created from 5.4c, there was a warning saying that the difference may be noticeable.
Looking at the actual differences, it makes sense that the warning would be present because there
is a more drastic difference when using the compressed image.
5.3.2.2 SilentEye Images
Another interesting finding is that when using SilentEye, if the original image contained areas
that were mostly one solid color, the stego image created had little squares throughout it where the
color was changed that was visible to the naked eye. Even if someone looking at the photo did not
know anything about steganography, they would probably notice that the image had weird squares
throughout it and wonder why. This was true both before and after images were put through the
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Facebook or Twitter compression method. So, being able to visually detect that the image had
been tampered with was not related to the size of the image or if the image went through any
compression. When the original image contained a lot of different colors and textures, the stego
image created did not have changes that could bee seen with the naked eye. Figure 5.6 is an
example of an image with a lot of solid color throughout it before and after the stego message was
embedded in it. Figure 5.7 is an example of an image with many different colors and textures
throughout before and after a stego message was embedded in it. If a person using Silent Eye did
not verify that their image still looked “normal” after the message was embedded, someone might
be able to tell that an image has been changed just by looking at it.
To investigate this further, Matlab was again used to find the difference between such images.
Figure 5.8a contains the difference between the cover and stego photos when a photo with a almost
solid color background was used. Here, the differences stand out and are very obvious. Unlike when
JP Hide & Seek is used, here the differences look like they follow a specific pattern rather than
random. Additionally, you can see parts of the image itself, as if it is doing some sort of compression
to the image and changing almost all of the bits.
Figure 5.8b contains the difference between the cover and stego photos when a photo with
more texture is used. Although the differences still look like they form pattern, they do not stand
out as much because they are almost swallowed up or hidden in the textures of the background. In
the darker, more solid areas of the image (i.e. in the corners), the differences still stand out.
5.4 Takeaways
One of the takeaways that can be gathered from the first case study is that it is possible to
create and share stego images on Facebook and Twitter. However, to do so, there is a very specific
procedure that must be followed. The first thing you have to do is upload and download the image
from the social media site in question so that it goes through the compression process prior to
hiding a message inside of it. The downside with this is that when a smaller size image is used,








Figure 5.7: Silent Eye Cover Image vs Stego Image 2
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(a) Difference between Figures 5.6a and 5.6b
(b) Difference between Figures 5.7a and 5.7b
Figure 5.8: Difference between Stego and Cover Photos created using SilentEye
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Another finding is that the method only works with Facebook cover photos. From an investi-
gators perspective, the pro with this is that there are a lot less images that need to be scanned
for stego messages. The drawback to this, however, is that cover photos are public, meaning that
anyone who has a Facebook account can see anyone else’s cover photo. So the subject pool of who
the message might be intended for if a stego message was found inside of a Facebook cover photo
is anyone who has a Facebook account.
Final recommendations for creating stego images to share on social media are to verify the stego
message exists before posting the image on social media. This needs to be done because there were
many cases in which the message was not successfully embedded into an image even before posting
it to the social media site. Lastly, if you do use this method to share a stego message on social
media, it is recommended that you delete the original photo. That way, someone would not be
confused or suspicious if they saw someone post two of what looked like the exact same photo.
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CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY 2: HOW TO DETECT STEGO IMAGES ON
SOCIAL MEDIA USING QUANTIZATION MATRICES
In order to try and find a way to detect the presence of stego images on social media, a second
case study was done. This case study focused on analyzing quantization matrices (QMs) to see
if they could be used to draw any conclusions about the image in question. To do so, all of the
images created in Chapter 5 were all ran through a tool to extract QMs.
6.1 QM Overview
A quantization matrix is something that only JPEG images have. When an image is compressed
into a JPEG image, it goes through the process depicted in Figure 6.1. First the image is broken up
into 8x8 bit blocks, a Discrete Cosine Transfer is done on those blocks, then that matrix is divided
by a quantizer table and put through an entropy encoder. The quantization matrix is essentially
a “constant” that everything is divided by during this process. The QM is designed to get rid of
unimportant bits and keep the important ones. There is no standard quantization matrix, although
there are many specific recommended ones. Since there is no industry standard table to use, many
cameras or application that compresses images into JPEGs use their own QM across all of their
images. Because of this, sometimes knowing the QM of a JPEG image can give an idea of where
the image came from.
There have been previous studies in which QMs were analyzed to determine if information can
be gathered from them. Hany Farid, a professor who specializes digital images, conducted such a
study in 2008 in which he tried to use QMs to determine what digital camera was used to take that
image [31]. He compared images take from different digital cameras and found that 62 of the 204
cameras had a unique QM. He concluded that “This simple observation allows for a rather crude
form of digital image ballistics, whereby the source of an image can be confirmed or denied.” The
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study done for this paper, similarly aims at trying to determine if different social media or stego
applications have unique QMs. If they do, then one could potentially use QMs to determine the
origin of that image.
Figure 6.1: How Quantization Matrices are used to compress images [2]
6.2 QM Method
After the images were created using the method above, all of the PC images (i.e. Images 1, 3,
4 and 6 in the Figure 5.1) were run through one of two applications to retrieve the Quantization
Matrix (QM) and Table Quality value. This was done to determine if the social media sites and/or
the stego apps used have a standard QM.
The following tools were used to generate the QM’s:
• On a Mac PC, the following website was used: https://29a.ch/photo-forensics/#jpeg-data
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• On a Windows PC, the ”JPEG Snoop” app was used, which can be downloaded from here:
https://www.impulseadventure.com/photo/jpeg-snoop.html
6.3 QM Findings
Through analyzing the images created, the following conclusions were drawn.
First and foremost, all images downloaded from twitter prior to creating the stego image (image
3 in figure 5.1) were the same. Table 6.1 and 6.1 show what the standard QM for twitter images is.
Table 6.1: Standard Twitter Quantization Tables
Table 0
5 3 4 4 4 3 5 4
4 4 5 5 5 6 7 12
8 7 7 7 7 15 11 11
9 12 17 15 18 18 17 15
17 17 19 22 28 23 19 20
26 21 17 17 24 33 24 26
29 29 31 31 31 19 23 34
36 34 30 36 28 30 31 30
Table 1
5 5 5 7 6 7 14 8
8 14 30 20 17 20 30 30
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Not all images downloaded from Facebook prior to creating a stego image (image 3 in figure
5.1) had the same Quantization Matrix. But 41 of the 57 images created (about 71.9%) did have
the same QM. See Table ?? for the most common quantization matrix seen for images downloaded
from Facebook.
Table 6.2: Most Common Facebook Quantization Table
Table 0
9 6 7 8 7 6 9 8
8 8 10 10 9 11 14 23
15 14 13 13 14 28 20 21
17 23 34 30 35 35 33 30
32 32 37 42 53 45 37 39
50 40 32 32 46 63 47 50
55 57 60 60 60 36 45 66
70 65 58 70 53 59 60 57
Table 1
10 10 10 14 12 14 27 15
15 27 57 38 32 38 57 57
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
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Another important discovery is that all images created using SilentEye had the same quanti-
zation matrix. Table 6.3 depicts what this table was. This was true for images created by Silent
Eye prior to uploading it to either social media site (Image 4 in Figure 5.1 above) AND after the
image was uploaded to then downloaded from either social media site (Image 6 in Figure 5.1 above).
Sixty other images not used in this study were analyzed to see if the standard QM for SilentEye
images was found in other images. The images tested included images from a PC, from an iPhone,
from an Android phone, images downloaded from Facebook, images downloaded from Twitter and
screenshots taken on an iPhone, to name a few. None of these sixty images had the same QM that
the SilentEye photos had. This is important because if an image downloaded from Facebook or
Twitter had the QM listed in 6.3, then we can conclude with a fair amount of certainty that the
image in question was created from Silent Eye and therefore has a secret message hidden inside it.
Table 6.3: Standard Silent Eye Quantization Table
Table 0
8 6 6 7 6 5 8 7
7 7 9 9 8 10 12 20
13 12 11 11 12 25 18 19
15 20 29 26 31 30 29 26
28 28 32 36 46 39 32 34
44 35 28 28 40 55 41 44
48 49 52 52 52 31 39 57
61 56 50 60 46 51 52 50
Table 1
9 9 9 12 11 12 24 13
13 24 50 33 28 33 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
When JP Hide & Seek was used to create stego images, the Quantization Matrix was the same
as the cover image. In reference to Figure 5.1, this means that image 3 had the same QM as image
4 when using JP Hide & Seek to create Image 4. Because of this, we can conclude that JP Hide &
Seek does not have it’s own standard QM and analyzing images QM’s will not give us any insight
into if that image was created using JP Hide & Seek.
6.3.1 Table Quality Values Findings
The Table Quality value was also looked at for each of the generated images. The section below
details the findings related to the Table Quality value.
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The chart below shows the different Table Quality values that were found for Facebook images
prior to generating a stego image (image 3 in the figure 5.1) and the frequency of those values. A
table quality of value 71 was fairly common. More analysis would need to be done to determine if
we could conclude that a JPEG image with a Table Quality of 71 came from Facebook. Since only
71.9% of images downloaded from Facebook had a table quality value of 71, we cannot assume that
if an image downloaded from Facebook does not have that table quality value that it was tampered
with.
Table 6.4: Table Quality Values for Facebook Images












All Twitter photos prior to generating a stego image (image 3 in the figure 5.1) had a Table
Quality value of 85. Therefore, if an image downloaded from Twitter did not have a table quality
value of 85 we could assume with a fair amount of certainty that that image may have been tampered
with.
All stego photos generated using the SilentEye app (for both images 4 and 6 in the figure 5.1)
had a Table Quality value of 75. Therefore, if an image downloaded from Facebook or Twitter had
a Table Quality value of 75 we can assume that that image was edited using SilentEye.
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6.4 Takeaways
Takeaways from the second case study are that we can use QM’s as a way to gather information
about an image and potentially determine if that image is a stego image. Essentially, if an image
contains the standard SilentEye QM, then one could conclude that that image probably contains a
stego message. If an image downloaded from Twitter does not contain the standard Twitter QM,
then one could conclude that that image was probably tampered with in some way. Since Facebook
did not seem to have a standard QM, then the confidence level is lower for being able to draw
conclusions based on the QM of an image downloaded from Facebook.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
7.1 Recommended Method for creating stego images to share on social media
Previous studies on this topic found that when they created stego images and shared them
to social media, that the compression the image went through in order to be shared on that site
oftentimes stripped the message from the image. This first case study done for this paper aimed
at finding a method in which stego images could be shared on social media without the message
being lost. This study found that the method depicted in figure 7.1 of sharing social media data
worked consistently.
Figure 7.1: Recommended method for creating and sharing stego messages on social media
Although the study has some success using JP Hide & Seek for creating stego messages, that
application had more failures than SilentEye. Also, JP Hide & Seek failed more often when the
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image was uploaded directly to the social media site from a phone rather than uploaded to the PC
then to the site. The reasoning that the first method of uploading the image directly to the social
media site from the phone is preferred is simply because it is one less step. Another benefit of using
SilentEye over JP Hide & Seek is that SilentEye is compatible with Windows, Macs and Linux.
If you compare the method depicted in figure 7.1 to the method shown in figure 5.1, you will
see that an additional step was added after creating the stego image and posting it to social media.
This Step (step 5 in Figure 7.1) says to ”Verify message can be extracted from the image”. It was
added because during the case study in Chapter 5 there were times that the stego message could
not be retrieved from the final image shared on social media. Upon further investigation, it was
determined that the image could not be retrieved from the stego image created even before posting
it to the social media site. This is most likely due to bugs in the SilentEye tool and not in how the
social media site compresses the image. The simplest way to avoid this failure is to verify that the
stego image created does contain the message prior to positing it to the social media site. If the
message cannot be extracted, try the method with a different image (i.e. start back at Step 1 with
a new image).
Another difference between the method used in Figure 5.1 an the method used in Figure 7.1 is
that a final step was added. This step recommends that once complete, the user should delete the
first image from the social media site. This is recommended because if someone was monitoring your
social media site and they saw two of the same images posted, they could compare the two images
and if they were different be suspicious that the second image could contain a secret message.
7.2 Recommended Method for detecting stego images on social media
A second case study was completed to that aimed at finding a way in which to detect if an
image shared on social media contained a secret message in it. The flow chart shown in Figure 7.2
depicts questions to ask in order to determine if an image posted on social media may contain a
secret message in it.
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Figure 7.2: Recommended method for determining if an image on social media is a stego image
Through analyzing the Quantization Matrices (QMs) of the images created, a couple other
important findings were discovered. The first finding is that all images downloaded from twitter
have the same QM. This can be seen in Table 6.1 above. This is important because if an investigator
was looking at images on twitter and downloaded said images, they could look at the QM of those
images and if they did not match the QM seen in Table 6.1, then they could gather that that image
had been tampered with in some way.
Additionally, all stego images created by SilentEye had the same QM even after it was posted
to and then re-downloaded from a social media site. If an image retrieved from a social media
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site had this QM, then an investigator could conclude that that image most likely contains a stego
message created by running it through SilentEye.
7.3 Conclusions and Future Research
This study and it’s findings are important because image and video steganography can be used
to share confidential or incriminating evidence or malware. Knowing how steganographic images
can be created and shared on social media sites and how investigators can detect the presence of
such messages is important to grasp the impact that this may have on our society. This can be used
by criminal organizations, such as the Al Qaeda to share data with each other in plain site. Or it
can affect your every day social media user who downloads a potential harmless looking image of
a puppy which ends up infecting their computer.
Fortunately, the way in which social media compresses images when they are posted to the site
limits the ways in which stego images can be shared on social media. Oftentimes this compression
method strips the image of its hidden message. This study found that it is possible to share images
on social media containing hidden messages. In order to do so, the user must first post an image
without the message, download that image, then encrypt it with the hidden message, and then
upload that message again. Another limitation of using Facebook in particular as a means of
distributing secret messages is that these images must be uploaded as Facebook cover photos. This
limits the size of information that can be shared. In one criminal case, noted in Section 3.3 above,
the message was embedded inside a video instead of an image because videos can store much more
data. If a user wished to share a long message embedded in an image, they would most likely
have to break the message up over multiple images. If a user could share stego images as regular
“Timeline photos” instead of cover photos, they could share a longer message by creating an entire
album of timeline photos and sharing them all at once. But since cover photos must be used, the
user would have to share the images one at a time which is more time consuming.
This study also found that one can detect the presence of a stego image if the SilentEye tool
was used to create the image by retrieving that image’s Quantization Matrix. All images created
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by SilentEye had the same QM even after that image was shared on a social media site. Because
of this, investigators can analyze QM’s of photos downloaded from Facebook or Twitter and if the
QM of that image matches the one shown in 6.3, then they can conclude that that image was most
likely created using the SilentEye app and contains hidden data in it.
In relation to the legal issues with social media, in order for investigators to use potential stego
images as evidence in court, they must be able to prove it is relevant and authentic as well as retrieve
the information legally. If a tool was developed that analyzed image’s quantization matrices for
certain values, this could be beneficial to investigators in the above circumstance. However, due
to privacy laws and sheer number of images, it may not be practical or feasible to scan every
single image posted on social media for a secret message or malware. Because a user’s social media
information is protected by the SCA, if such a tool was developed, the social media sites themselves
would have to deploy and monitor the tool. This is due to the fact that investigators do not have
the right to all of a person’s social media information unless they have a relevant case in which to
investigate that individual. Because stenography is not inherently bad, social media sites may be
reluctant to deploy such a tool.
One recommendation for future work to complete on this topic would be to perform more case
studies on different stego app/social media combinations. The purpose of those case studies, similar
to the purpose of this study, would be to see if that application can be used to create stego images
to share on social media. Additionally, that study could also gather information on if that social
media site or stego application have a standard QM that could be used to determine the origin of
said image.
Another future topic of study would be to determine why stego messages are sometimes lost
when posted to social media. One could investigate the specific compression method used for
different social media sites, if those methods are public knowledge. They could also investigate if
images with different properties (such as a smaller size) do not get compressed when posted. This
could potentially remove the necessity for posting images on social media twice. Instead of posting
the original image to allow it to go to the compression process before embedding the message, users
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could change the properties of the image (such as make it a smaller size) before putting the stego
message into it, knowing that the image will not be compressed.
From a more political/legal standpoint, it would be interesting to see if social media sites are
currently scanning for stego images or if there is any actual data on how many images on social
media sites may contain stego data. Also, if one were to implement a program that looked for stego
images by analyzing QMs or looking for similar images on someones profile it would be interesting
to see if social media sites would be interested in using such a tool or if investigators would use
it in the case that they were granted legal access to someones social media account during an
investigation.
Although there is more research to do on this topic, this study helped to open up the idea that
it is possible to use social media as a means of sharing stego images and there are ways in which
to detect stego images created by specific applications through analyzing QMs.
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